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PRECEDENT AND RELIANCE
Randy J. Kozel∗
Among the most prevalent justifications for deference to judicial precedent
is the protection of reliance interests. The theory is that when judicial
pronouncements have engendered significant reliance, there should be a
meaningful presumption against adjudicative change. Yet there remains a
fundamental question as to why reliance on precedent warrants judicial
protection in the first place. American courts have made clear that deference
to precedent is a flexible policy rather than an absolute rule. The defeasibility
of precedent raises the possibility that stakeholders who fail to mediate their
reliance on precedent forfeit any claim to judicial protection through the
doctrine of stare decisis.
This Article explores the dynamics and implications of precedential
reliance. It contends that the case for protecting reliance on precedent is
uncertain. There are several reasons why reliance might potentially be worth
protecting, but all are subject to serious limitations or challenges. To bolster
the doctrine of stare decisis while the status of precedential reliance continues
to be worked out, the Article suggests a conceptual move away from backwardlooking reliance and toward the forward-looking interest in managing the
disruptive impacts of adjudicative change for society at large.

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments and conversations,
thanks to Amy Barrett, Joseph Bauer, Anthony Bellia, Barry Cushman, Daniel Farber, Richard Garnett, Bruce
Huber, Daniel Kelly, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and Jeffrey Pojanowski. Arthur Gregg provided excellent
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Precedent occupies an intriguing place in American legal discourse. The
prospect of deference to past decisions, even decisions that are dubious or
erroneous, has spawned its fair share of critics on both theoretical and practical
grounds.1 Nevertheless, the abstract virtues of following precedent continue to
draw widespread support. Among those virtues is the protection of reliance
expectations. The basic claim is that stakeholder reliance should occasionally
persuade judges to accept interpretations of the law they would otherwise
reject.2
If reliance expectations possess the power to forestall the evolution and
refinement of the law, there ought to be a well-developed account of where
that power comes from. The explanation cannot be that judicial overrulings are
breaches of promise. Consider the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court. Time
and again, the Court has cautioned that while deference to precedent is “the
preferred course,”3 it is not “an inexorable command.”4 The Court can, does,
and will continue to overrule its precedents when it sees fit. At the same time,
the Court consistently invokes precedential reliance as a prime rationale for
deferring to precedent. Justice Scalia has explained this solicitude by asserting
that reliance on “unabandoned” precedent “is always justifiable reliance.”5
These two propositions—precedent is mutable; and reliance on the
durability of precedent is both reasonable and entitled to judicial respect—
stand in apparent tension. Indeed, the flexibility of stare decisis provides some
basis for contending that it is actually unreasonable to rely on the durability of
precedent. Given the unveiled reality that judicial decisions are subject to
reconsideration, stakeholders might be expected to take their own measures to
mitigate the costs of a potential overruling, just as actors must take precautions
or purchase insurance in order to manage other types of risk. Moreover, by
publicly announcing that precedents are subject to reconsideration, the Court
1 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Essay, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1173, 1173 (2006) (“[S]tare decisis has . . . been portrayed as a betrayal of the judge’s duty to follow the law
and thus of the rule of law itself.”); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 648 (1999) (collecting some of the more colorful
“condemn[ations]” of stare decisis as applied by the Supreme Court).
2 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2028 (1994) (“[R]eliance interests
often tip the balance in favor of retaining a rule of law that might otherwise be overturned.”).
3 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
4 Id. at 828.
5 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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might be seen as avoiding any normative obligation to stakeholders who would
be harmed by an overruling. Precedents are not promises,6 and when the Court
chooses to overturn a prior decision, it does nothing more than exercise an
option that it previously reserved. Why, then, should precedential reliance
serve as an obstacle to adjudicative change?
The primary goal of this Article is to situate reliance interests within a
universe of precedential uncertainty. The Article begins by drawing out some
of the nuance that pervades the relationship between precedent and reliance. I
hope to show that the arguments for treating precedential reliance as deserving
of judicial protection are complex and warranting of greater scrutiny than they
tend to receive in the caselaw.
The Article’s second aim is to articulate a proposal for rationalizing the
modern doctrine of stare decisis in its treatment of stakeholder expectations. I
suggest that the doctrine might be put on firmer ground through a conceptual
shift. The reason for being attentive to stakeholder expectations need not be ex
ante effects on investment incentives or a moral obligation to protect those
who relied on past judicial decisions. The significance of stakeholder
expectations may stem from something simpler: a desire to control the
disruptive impacts of adjudicative change for the benefit of society as a whole.
From this perspective, the question is less about whether past reliance should
be protected and more about how departures from precedent are likely to prove
disruptive going forward. Deferring to a precedent whose overruling would
have dramatic effects on settled expectations becomes a mechanism for
controlling the degree of disruption that is injected into the legal system
through the process of adjudicative change.
Reframing the debate in terms of disruption and transition costs would not
obviate the need for continued analysis of reliance interests. It may be that the
disruption-oriented approach is insufficiently protective of precedential
reliance because it understates the fairness and rule-of-law implications of

6 Cf. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994) (using similar language with respect to a
retroactive change in the tax laws and stating that “a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue
Code”). The Supreme Court has referred to itself as giving a “promise of constancy” whose violation would
represent a “breach of faith,” but its statement was related to those exceptional situations in which the Court
“calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division.” Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867–68 (1992). And even there, the Court qualified its “promise” by noting that it
lasts only so long as “the understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the
commitment obsolete.” Id. at 868.

KOZEL GALLEYSPROOFS1

1462

7/11/2013 1:53 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1459

adjudicative change.7 I accept the possibility that such an argument may
eventually emerge as persuasive. My claim is that shifting the conceptual focus
to forward-looking disruption is a useful means of fortifying the modern
doctrine of stare decisis so long as the case for protecting reliance qua reliance
remains uncertain.
The focus on forward-looking disruption also has implications for the
scope of impact that is relevant to the stare decisis enterprise. Overrulings can
create destabilizing consequences for stakeholders beyond those who are
directly affected by the applicable substantive rule. Employing the lens of
forward-looking disruption underscores the utility of a systemic perspective
that contemplates the numerous ways, both direct and indirect, that an
overruling can affect individuals and institutions.8 The Supreme Court has
hinted at this type of wide-ranging vision of systemic effects on a few
occasions, but its treatments of the issue have been abbreviated.9 Connecting
the systemic perspective with the disruption-based account provides a
framework for fuller appreciation of the costs that can attend departures from
settled law.
This Article begins in Part I by surveying the theoretical grounds on which
stare decisis is commonly justified and explaining the value of a more
foundational inquiry into the reliance interest. After a brief interlude in Part II
to set the Article’s methodological parameters, Part III addresses the leading
arguments for deeming precedential reliance as worthy of judicial protection
through the doctrine of stare decisis. Part IV suggests the desirability of
recasting the jurisprudential concern with reliance in terms of the avoidance of
future disruption costs. Part V then explains how the analytical move toward
disruption emphasizes the need for a systemic view of the consequences of
judicial overruling. Finally, Part VI offers some thoughts about the inquiry into
systemic disruption within the context of litigating and resolving concrete
disputes. My focus throughout will be the experience of the U.S. Supreme
Court, though much of my analysis will be applicable to any court that treats
its own precedents as worthy of presumptive deference on grounds including
their tendency to generate reliance interests.

7

See infra Part III.B–C.
On the role of precedent in promoting the stability of the legal equilibrium, see, for example, Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
54, 111–13 (1997).
9 See infra Part IV.C.
8
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I. JUSTIFYING STARE DECISIS
The classic explanation of why even dubious precedents may warrant
respect is Justice Brandeis’s declaration in 1932 that “in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”10 The Supreme Court has returned to this sentiment over the years,11
though it should be remembered that Justice Brandeis also emphasized (in the
very same opinion) the wisdom of overruling erroneous decisions of a
particular sort: those that misinterpret the Constitution.12 In constitutional
cases, he contended, “[t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning.”13
The tension between the importance of settlement and the desire to reap the
benefits of “experience” and “better reasoning” has continued to shape
disputes over precedent into the twenty-first century. That tension transcends
the distinction between constitutional and statutory cases. Though the Court
portrays its statutory decisions as entitled to the strongest form of deference,14

10 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
11 See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008); California v. FERC,
495 U.S. 490, 500 (1990).
12 See Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often
overruled its earlier decisions.”).
13 Id. at 407–08; see also Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2010) (“Particularly in constitutional cases, the Justices emphasize,
undue insistence on the principle of stare decisis would tether the country to judicial interpretations of the
Constitution absent the rare and difficult event of a constitutional amendment.”).
14 Following the approach advocated by Justice Brandeis, the modern Court applies an especially strong
form of stare decisis to most of its statutory decisions. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 172–73 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation,
for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
This Article draws no distinction between statutory and constitutional precedents. Its focus is the
treatment of stakeholder expectations, which arise in both contexts. To the extent one believes that statutory
precedents deserve an additional degree of deference based on notions of implied congressional acquiescence
or separation-of-powers norms, that deference could be integrated with the framework this Article develops for
analyzing disruption costs. For explorations of the statutory–constitutional divide, see, for example, Amy
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 322–27 (2005),
which discusses the conventional justifications for super-strong statutory stare decisis; and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988), which refers to a “three-tiered
hierarchy” in which common law precedents “enjoy a strong presumption of correctness,” constitutional
precedents create “a relaxed, or weaker, form of that presumption,” and statutory precedents “often enjoy a
super-strong presumption of correctness.”
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the presumption of adhering to precedent operates even in the constitutional
context.15 Some extra justification is required before a prior decision of either
sort may be repudiated.16
The Court’s rationale for deferring to precedent draws on several animating
principles. Stare decisis serves the “constitutional ideal” of the “rule of law”17
by ensuring—and demonstrating to the interested public—that “bedrock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals.”18 Given the presumptive resistance to overruling past decisions,
change tends to be incremental rather than revolutionary, facilitating the
gradual assimilation of new rules into the overarching legal framework.19
Institutionalizing a presumption of deference also reduces the incidence of
15 See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (“Although the doctrine is not rigidly observed in constitutional cases, ‘[w]e should not
be . . . unmindful, even when constitutional questions are involved, of the principle of stare decisis, by whose
circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court as an institution transcending the moment can alone be
brought to bear on the difficult problems that confront us.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the
Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1195–96 (2008) (noting that the
Supreme Court “continues to rely on precedent in interpreting the Constitution, and neither the President nor
Congress has objected to this longstanding practice”).
16 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e have
long recognized that departures from precedent are inappropriate in the absence of a ‘special justification.’”
(quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984))); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 864 (1992) (recognizing the principle that “a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided”); cf. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Who ignores [stare decisis] must give
reasons, and reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the
doctrine would be no doctrine at all).”); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453,
1462 (2010) (“Courts bound by stare decisis generally believe themselves obligated to provide a much stronger
rationale for abandoning their prior decisions than they would feel obligated to provide if they are simply
choosing to ignore persuasive precedent.”).
17 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854
(“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that
a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 419–20 (1983) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a
constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law.”),
overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
18 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986); see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375, 403 (1970) (noting that stare decisis is justified in part by “the necessity of maintaining public faith in the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments”).
19 Cf. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 137
(2011) (“[A] strong doctrine of stare decisis is consistent with a judiciary characterized by steadiness and
gradualism rather than erratic change.”); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 946–47 (2008) (justifying deference to precedent based
on factors including the “conviction that the judiciary plays a vital role in serving as a protector of continuity
in the context of incremental change”).
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interpretive vacillation20 and fosters a sense of stability and order, which (the
argument goes) enhances public confidence and gives citizens a firmer basis
for planning their affairs.21 The salience of these values is reinforced by the
Justices’ musings outside the work of the Court. The connection between stare
decisis and the ideal of law as impersonal is evident in then-Judge Cardozo’s
famous statement that it would be “intolerable if the weekly changes in the
composition of the court” were to beget corresponding fluctuations in the
content of legal rules.22 Justice Powell advanced a comparable position in
contending that it would “undermine the rule of law” if stare decisis were
discarded in constitutional cases, for the Constitution would be reduced to
“nothing more than what five Justices say it is.”23
A related fixture in the Court’s discussions of stare decisis is the reliance
interest of stakeholders whose lives and livelihoods are affected by judicial
precedent.24 The ultimate objective of stare decisis, Justice Scalia has
explained, is to safeguard the “legitimate expectations of those who live under
the law.”25 Similar sentiments are evident in Planned Parenthood of
20 See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 265 (describing stare decisis as “the means by which we ensure that the law
will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion”).
21 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 855
(including among the relevant questions whether an overruling could occur “without serious inequity to those
who have relied upon [a precedent] or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it”).
22 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 208 (2008) (defining stare decisis as the “principle that carefully
considered constitutional interpretations issued by the organs of government should not be revisited absent
circumstances more compelling than a mere change in the identity of the individuals who authored the
interpretations in question”); Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT.
REV. 211, 217 (“Decisions can hardly gain acceptance as based upon the enduring principles of the
Constitution without the prospect that they will live an ‘indefinite while,’ at least beyond the life expectancy of
the Justices deciding them.”).
23 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990).
24 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct.
2079, 2088–89 (2009); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722–23 (2009); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
811 (2009); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008); Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (Breyer, J.); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 239
(2012) (“[An] equitable principle, prominent in judicial decisions stretching back hundreds of years, directs
judges to give due weight to the ways in which litigants who come before the Court may have reasonably
relied upon prior case law.”).
25 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); accord Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] exists for the purpose of introducing certainty and
stability into the law and protecting the expectations of individuals and institutions that have acted in reliance
on existing rules.”), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 412 (2012) (noting that the “criteria for stare
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court noted that the “inquiry
into reliance counts the cost of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those
who have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued application.”26 The
protection of reliance interests is commonly intertwined with values of
predictability, stability, and the rule of law.27 So well established is the
relevance of reliance that, even while departing from precedent, the Court has
offered reassurance that “reliance on a judicial opinion [remains] a significant
reason to adhere to it.”28
Beyond the reflections of Supreme Court Justices, inquiry into the
analytical underpinnings of stare decisis has generated a robust scholarly
literature. The literature is vast, but certain strands can be singled out as
particularly helpful in unpacking the doctrine’s conceptual foundations. For
example, the frequent correlation of precedent with rule-of-law values is the
subject of recent work by Jeremy Waldron. Professor Waldron contended that
the rule of law requires a judge to “derive her particular decisions from an
identified and articulated general norm.”29 The converse situation, in which the
judge “thinks of herself only as deciding [a] particular case” without any
reference to general norms, exemplifies the “rule of men rather than the rule of
law.”30 Professor Waldron also defended a principle of institutional
responsibility that requires subsequent judges to give precedents their proper
effect,31 as well as a principle of constancy that militates against rapid
change.32 For Professor Waldron, these elements converge to illustrate how the
operation of precedent can facilitate the rule of law. His argument bears some
similarities to that of Daniel Farber, who has characterized deference to
precedent as promoting the type of judicial “neutrality” that comes from
“articulating standards that one is willing to live with in the future.”33
decisis” include consideration of “whether harm will be caused to those who justifiably relied on the
decision”).
26 Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
27 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“We recognize that stare decisis embodies
an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need
to satisfy reasonable expectations.”).
28 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007).
29 Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20
(2012).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 22–26, 31.
32 See id. at 26–29; id. at 28 (noting that “refraining from overruling is not the same as the basic respect
for the principle of a previous decision, which is the essence of following a precedent”).
33 Farber, supra note 1, at 1179. Professor Farber also defended stare decisis as promoting clarity through
the setting down of stable rules. See id. (“[O]nly by following the reasoning of previous decisions can the
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Beyond the rule of law, scholars have scrutinized a host of other values that
are sometimes associated with deference to precedent. In his study of models
of precedential constraint, Larry Alexander emphasized the link between
precedent and predictability.34 Predictability likewise was prominent in the
work of Frederick Schauer,35 though Professor Schauer departed from
Professor Alexander in also giving import to the role of precedent in promoting
fairness through the consistent treatment of different parties across time.36 By
comparison, some commentators have devoted more of their attention to the
role of stare decisis in advancing institutional and pragmatic goals. Among
those taking such an approach are Thomas Merrill, who has depicted stare
decisis as a source of judicial restraint,37 and then-Judge Cardozo, who
emphasized its implications for judicial efficiency.38 There is also an
informative literature in the law-and-economics spirit that considers the extent
to which the doctrine of stare decisis might be employed to enhance social
welfare by, among other things, performing “cost-saving functions.”39

courts provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases. . . . By
articulating standards that are binding for the future, courts can offer some semblance of what has been called
the ‘law of rules,’ which is one aspect of the rule of law.” (footnote omitted) (citing Antonin Scalia, Essay, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989))).
34 Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1989).
35 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987) (“When a decisionmaker must
decide this case in the same way as the last, parties will be better able to anticipate the future. The ability to
predict what a decisionmaker will do helps us plan our lives, have some degree of repose, and avoid the
paralysis of foreseeing only the unknown.” (footnote omitted)).
36 Compare id. at 596 (“We achieve fairness by decisionmaking rules designed to achieve consistency
across a range of decisions. . . . Where the consistency among decisions takes place over time, we call our
decisional rule ‘precedent.’”), with Alexander, supra note 34, at 10 (arguing that “there is no intertemporal
equality value of sufficient weight to support precedential constraint; intertemporal equality cannot convert an
otherwise morally erroneous decision into a correct one”). Other commentators have also addressed the
legitimacy of substantive equality in relation to stare decisis. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency:
On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2038 (1996) (contending that the
“supposedly substantive principle of equality fails as a justification of stare decisis because, first, its purported
effects can be explained as well by nonegalitarian justice, and, second, its application necessarily produces
both internal inconsistency and injustice”).
37 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274 (2005) (arguing that “someone who believes in judicial restraint should favor a
strong theory of precedent . . . in constitutional law”); Powell, supra note 23, at 289–90 (“In the long run,
restraint in decisionmaking and respect for decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an independent
judiciary and public respect for the judiciary’s role as a guardian of rights.”).
38 See CARDOZO, supra note 22, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks
on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”).
39 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 648 (2000).
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Most relevant to this Article, scholars have scrutinized the interplay
between judicial precedent and reliance interests. Both Larry Alexander40 and
Michael Paulsen41 have raised (in very different ways) salient questions
regarding the formation of reliance expectations notwithstanding the shadow of
precedential uncertainty. Randy Barnett has discussed the role of reliance in
carving out space for individual redress where “citizens have reasonably relied
upon erroneous decisions of the past in a manner that should be protected.”42
More generally, in his economic analysis of legal transitions Louis Kaplow
criticized the reliance interest as depending on the flawed premise that “it is
reasonable to expect laws never to change.”43 Professor Kaplow went on to
recognize that “even if actors rationally expect that legal change of a given
type is unlikely, there is still the question of whether they have a compelling
normative claim to fulfillment of that expectation.”44
The relationship between precedent and settled expectations is also central
to the literature on “super precedents.” Commentators such as Michael
Gerhardt have contended that there exists a class of judicial decisions that have
generated so much reliance and become so well accepted as to be “practically
immune to reconsideration and reversal.”45 In somewhat similar terms, Daniel
Farber has defended the retention of “bedrock precedents” as a means of
preserving “a stable framework for government.”46
Insights like these raise critical issues relating to the manner in which
reliance expectations develop and the consequences of disrupting them. The
project of this Article is to pull these issues together and move the discussion

40

See Alexander, supra note 34, at 13–14.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1553–54 (2000).
42 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 257, 266 (2005); see also id. (“Even if we assume that . . . the Social Security Act is
unconstitutional because it violates the original meaning of the Constitution, the government might still be
obligated to make good on its promises to those who have relied to their detriment upon them. . . . [A]
commitment to original meaning over precedent does not entail a commitment to rejecting properly tailored
reliance claims by individual citizens.”).
43 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 522 (1986).
44 Id. at 524.
45 Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (2006) [hereinafter
Gerhardt, Super Precedent]; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1279, 1293 (2008) (“Nothing becomes a superprecedent . . . unless it has been widely and uniformly accepted
by public authorities generally, including the Court, the President, and Congress.”).
46 See Farber, supra note 1, at 1180. Still, Professor Farber left open the prospect of overruling bedrock
precedents for “compelling reasons.” See id. at 1176.
41
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forward by focusing on a fundamental question: Why should reliance on
precedent warrant judicial protection in the first place?
II. METHODOLOGICAL PARAMETERS
Having provided a rough sketch of the conceptual landscape, I pause for a
brief note on this Article’s methodological approach. As noted, my objective is
to take a step forward in theorizing the dynamics of precedential reliance. Four
features of that project should be kept in mind. First, this Article assumes that
deference to precedent is lawful, even when a precedent is dubious on the
merits. This position has drawn some scholarly criticism with respect to
constitutional cases,47 but it remains consistent with the view of most
commentators that deference to precedent (even constitutional precedent) is
permissible under certain conditions.48 It also coheres with the established
practice of the Supreme Court in describing the doctrine of stare decisis as
legitimate, though not absolute.49
Second, though this Article uses the general term precedent, its topic is
more precisely defined as horizontal precedent, meaning a court’s adherence to
its own past decisions. The concept of horizontal precedent is distinct from
what is often called vertical or hierarchical precedent, which refers to the
binding effect of a superior court’s opinion on hierarchically inferior courts.50
At the center of this Article is the question of what relevance the Supreme
Court should ascribe to reliance interests in determining whether to follow its
own precedents.
47 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Response, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response
to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (2006); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27–28 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 913 (2009); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005).
48 See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 1, 3 n.12 (2007) (noting the continued prevalence of the view that deference to precedent can be lawful
even in constitutional cases).
49 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (indicating that the applicability
of the Bill of Rights to the states is affected by “considerations of stare decisis”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010) (“Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons
demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2812 (2008) (considering “whether any of our precedents forecloses the conclusions we have
reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment”).
50 For an influential treatment of the bindingness of hierarchical precedent, see generally Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). On the
various roles of precedent in the realm of constitutional adjudication, see generally Randy J. Kozel, Settled
Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843 (2013).
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Third, in exploring the operation of stare decisis at the Supreme Court, this
Article accepts the Court’s description of the doctrine as flexible rather than
compulsory.51 In an alternate world in which deference to precedent was so
powerful as to foreclose the reconsideration of past decisions,52 the dynamics
and implications of precedential reliance might well be different. The Court,
however, has not described itself as absolutely compelled to follow any
precedent, even in statutory cases where the power of stare decisis is at its
apex.53
Finally, this Article deals with precedential strength, not precedential
scope. The former term refers to the strength of presumptive deference that an
applicable precedent will receive. The latter term deals with the issue of
whether a given precedent really is on point, as opposed to being inapposite or
plausibly distinguishable. By adopting a focus on precedential strength, the
Article surely does not mean to imply that questions of scope are unimportant
or peripheral. Indeed, one of the most significant and complex challenges
presented by the doctrine of stare decisis is delineating the extent of a
precedent’s binding force. Alas, there is only so much one can do within the
confines of a single article. Thus, I take as my paradigm those cases in which a
precedent cannot plausibly be distinguished, leaving the reviewing court with
the stark choice between reaffirming and overruling. In such situations, the
scope question has already been answered. All that remains is the strength of
deference—a consideration that is commonly described as bound up with the
protection of reliance interests.54
III. WHY PROTECT RELIANCE?
The previous two Parts were framed broadly. They surveyed common
theoretical justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis and specified the
methodological parameters for the balance of the Article. This Part narrows the
focus to reliance interests themselves. It begins by presenting the argument that
51 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command . . . .”).
52 The experience of the House of Lords prior to 1966 is often cited as an example of this approach. But
cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 127 (2008) (“Before 1966, the House of
Lords had distinguished some of its own precedents to the point where they were effectively stripped of
authority.”).
53 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399,
418 (2001) (“[U]nder current law, there is no absolute rule of stare decisis, even for cases of statutory
interpretation.”).
54 See supra Part I.
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reliance on precedent ought not be protected. It then proceeds through a
number of potential responses, drawing on considerations that range from
fairness implications to investment incentives. I ultimately conclude that the
case for protecting precedential reliance is too uncertain and underdeveloped to
be entirely persuasive.
A. The Prima Facie Case Against Reliance
Legal changes create winners and losers.55 Deviations from judicial
precedent are a form of legal change. The question thus arises of how the
plight of stakeholders whose fortunes would be impaired by an overruling
should affect a court’s choice between retaining and discarding a flawed
precedent.
The Supreme Court’s approach to stare decisis evinces a pronounced
ambivalence. As explained above, respect for precedent—even dubious
precedent—is commonly described as integral to the preservation of important
values.56 Yet the Court has made equally clear that, despite its benefits, the
practice of deferring to precedent remains a defeasible principle characterized
by flexibility; far from an “inexorable command,”57 deference is a matter of
judicial “policy”58 and discretion.59 The Court occasionally goes to great
lengths to emphasize just how vulnerable its past decisions can be. Among the
most vivid illustrations is Payne v. Tennessee, where the Court, en route to
renouncing a decision issued only five years prior, explained that overrulings
represent an ordinary part of doing business: “[T]he Court has during the past
55 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
161, 161 (2003) (“Legal change, whether through legislation, regulation, or court decision, is a common
phenomenon, and virtually all reform creates both gains and losses for those who under the prior regime took
actions that would have lasting effects.”).
56 See supra Part I; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[S]tare
decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and
difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary
discretion.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888))),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
57 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
58 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
59 See, e.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (“The rule of stare decisis, though one tending
to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once
decided.”); Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 93, 94 (2003) (stating that “it is arguably a misnomer to describe stare decisis as a legal doctrine as well
as perhaps misleading to describe precedents in terms of obligation”).
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20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional
decisions.”60 Though the Court may believe strongly in the abstract appeal of
reaffirming precedents irrespective of their merits, it has reserved the right to
reconsider and overturn any given opinion.61
The Court’s avowed prerogative to overrule itself should affect the manner
in which rational actors respond to its precedents.62 The point can be illustrated
with a simple example. Imagine an interaction between two parties, X and Y. X
currently intends to pursue a certain course of action at some future date. She
informs Y of her intention. Nevertheless, she also cautions Y that she reserves
the right to change her mind at any time; that is, she makes no promises.63 In
addition, X describes numerous previous instances in which she did, in fact,
deviate from her initial intentions.
In deciding how to react, Y will refrain from behaving as though X’s course
of conduct is guaranteed. Instead, Y will account for the possibility that X
might change her mind yet again. Later, if X really does deviate from her initial
intentions, Y will not have any compelling claim for redress. Assuming that Y
took suitable precautions against X’s change of heart, additional compensation
would be an unwarranted windfall. And if Y did not take precautions, any
compensation would reward him for what was either carelessness or a
calculated gamble.
The foregoing illustration bears structural similarities to the relationship
between the Supreme Court and stakeholders who are affected by judicial

60 501 U.S. at 828; see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 (“Our precedents are not sacrosanct, for we have
overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established.”); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing numerous examples of
overrulings), overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
61 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that if stare
decisis were an absolute requirement, “segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be
unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining
warrants”); Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334, 334 (1944) (“There is no
infallibility about the makers of precedents. We cannot deny to the judicial process capacity for improvement,
adaptation, and alteration unless we are prepared to leave all evolution and progress in the law to legislative
processes.”).
62 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 78
(1989) (“Expectations about legal obligations depend not only on the prevailing legal rule but also on the
prevailing judicial practice. If the system does not adhere to stare decisis, no one will formulate expectations
about her future legal obligations on that assumption.”).
63 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. e (1981) (“Words of promise which by their
terms make performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor’ whatever may happen, or whatever course of
conduct in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise.”).
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precedent. Stakeholders are aware (at least constructively) that fidelity to
precedent is the ordinary course, but that the Court reserves the right to
overrule itself.64 Likewise, stakeholders need not look far to find numerous
examples of situations in which the Court has departed from its past
decisions.65 Given this backdrop, one might contend that when stakeholders
are deciding how to organize their affairs, they should be expected to tailor
their behaviors based on the possibility of adjudicative change.66 Further, when
the Court is contemplating a reversal of course, it should not be troubled by the
notion that it is breaking its word. The Court has already announced that it
occasionally will overrule its prior decisions. As a result, the argument goes,
the exercise of that option cannot subvert anyone’s reasonable expectations.67
B. Fairness
One rejoinder to the foregoing claim is that respect for reliance on
precedent is integral to treating stakeholders fairly.68 But determining why
disregarding reliance would be unfair—particularly given the Supreme Court’s
disclaimers that all precedents are subject to reconsideration—turns out to be
complex. We might imagine five potential explanations.

64

See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 827–28.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require
Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1179 (2008)
(“Given that the courts have said, too many times to count, that the idea of stare decisis is not, and never has
been, one of absolute adherence to a prior decision, and given the innumerable times that the Supreme Court
has reconsidered and overruled its prior constitutional interpretations, there is not much more reason to expect
that any given judicial interpretation will not change than there is to expect that a legislature will not enact a
new statute.”).
66 See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 525–26 (“Perceptive investors will typically act on probability estimates
of possible changes in the legal regime, just as they will take into account the probabilities of changes in
relevant market conditions . . . .”); Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1554 (“Rational actors should rely on a
decision’s remaining the rule only to the extent that it can be predicted that the courts will adhere to the
decision as correct. To the extent that this is uncertain, prudent businesspersons should purchase insurance
against (or learn to live with) the risk of changing judicial decisions . . . .”).
67 Cf. Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 796, 817 (1983) (“As long as the general rules of the game make clear in advance that the specific rules
of the game are subject to change, the player cannot complain about per se unfairness merely because such a
change is in fact effected.”).
68 See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for the Reliance Interest, 13
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 77 (2003) (noting the argument that “[i]ndividuals have a right to rely on the
law as it is stated and should not be penalized after the fact for actions that were legal when made”); Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of
New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1730–31 (2007) (discussing the argument that “it is unfair to
require actors who have invested in an upgrade before a new regulation takes effect to once again undertake
costly compliance with a new standard”).
65
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1. Lack of Voluntary Choice
The first explanation challenges the assumption that stakeholders have
meaningful choices about how they react to judicial decisions. The argument
unfolds as follows: even if we are willing to posit that stakeholders should be
held responsible for the actions they voluntarily take in reliance on precedent,
there are numerous situations in which adherence to precedent is effectively or
practically unavoidable. Some precedents contain legal interpretations that are
designed to restrict and shape particular behaviors, such as constitutional
guidelines for lawful police searches.69 Other precedents create regimes that
could only be circumvented through heroic efforts. An individual citizen might
well determine that there are doubts about the correctness of the Legal Tender
Cases, which upheld the validity of paper money.70 The citizen might also
recognize that it is at least conceivable that the Supreme Court eventually will
overrule the Legal Tender Cases. And still the citizen might be excused for
continuing to rely on paper money as lawful, because the alternative is simply
too burdensome to represent an appropriate obligation for a government to
impose upon the public. In such situations, the citizen’s decision to rely on
precedent may be seen as a fait accompli rather than the product of reasoned
deliberation and discretion. Norms of fairness accordingly would require
judicial respect for the citizen’s reliance interests, lest she be punished for
actions over which she had no real control.
This position has some force, but the scope of its impact is limited. The
rationale only applies to judicial precedents whose implications are effectively
or practically unavoidable. Thus, it does not justify protecting reliance in the
many situations in which stakeholder reactions to precedent are truly
discretionary. A corporation that arranges its operations so as to exploit a
judicial interpretation of the tax laws takes an affirmative and calculated step
in the interest of profit maximization.71 Likewise, a political organization that
69 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Many searches—
almost certainly including more than a few that figure in cases now on appeal—were conducted in scrupulous
reliance on [the precedent in question].”).
70 See Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender
Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 122 n.15 (2006) (“The first of the Legal Tender Cases, Hepburn v. Griswold, 5 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 603 (1870), was overruled the following year by Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). The
third and final case, Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884), was decided a decade later.”); id. at 123
(noting that in Knox, the Court “held that creating greenbacks was a valid use of implied authority as a
wartime exigency,” and in Juilliard, the Court “upheld the use of paper money in peacetime”).
71 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992) (“[I]t is not unlikely that the mail-order
industry’s dramatic growth over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state
taxation created in [National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)].”).
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crafts a fundraising plan predicated upon its ability to accept donations from
corporations and labor unions is reacting to existing precedent in a strategic
fashion.72 Where a stakeholder’s risk exposure arises primarily from his own
voluntary speculation, the argument for viewing precedential reliance as
inevitable ceases to apply. In those situations, forestalling adjudicative change
to protect reliance interests would allow stakeholders to externalize the
downside risk of their affirmative decisions. Society at large would be forced
to subsidize the stakeholders by enduring the continued operation of an
outdated or unsound interpretation of the law.73
2. Uncertainty
Contending that stakeholders should discount their reliance based on the
possibility of a future overruling assumes that they can, in fact, make
meaningful predictions about the trajectory of judicial decisions. If that
assumption is faulty, it might follow that stakeholders are incapable of
managing the risk of judicial overrulings in a rational and effective manner.
Disregard of their plight by the judiciary would become tantamount to
subjecting them to unavoidable harms.
While it is foreseeable that the Supreme Court will occasionally depart
from precedent, predicting which precedents will be overruled—and when
those overrulings will occur—is much more difficult.74 One accordingly might
contend that, to borrow a distinction drawn by Larry Alexander, predictions
about precedent are not just risky but fundamentally uncertain.75 The
difficulties are exacerbated by the role of the Court’s changing composition in
affecting the prospects of overruling.76 Given the impediments to accurate
72

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
Cf. Larry Alexander, Introduction to the Conference on Legal Transitions, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 3 (2003) (“[T]he mere fact that someone chooses to occupy a house does not look like the kind of
choice that should render the government’s decision to take that house in order to build a road a matter of
‘choice’ rather than a piece of brute bad luck. On the other hand, if someone could buy any of several houses,
but purchases the one that he knows is at high risk of being taken by the government, the taking looks less like
brute bad luck and more like an outcome for which the chooser should bear the cost.”).
74 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 79 (2008) (contending that “the actual process
of deciding cases has enough play in the joints to make it difficult, if not impossible, to predict which
particular precedents the justices will agree to weaken, if not overrule”).
75 See Alexander, supra note 73, at 2 (“Risk represents known probabilities of outcomes and can be
rationally weighed in prudential or moral decisionmaking . . . . Uncertainty, on the other hand, represents
ignorance of the distribution and incidence of various outcomes and confounds prudential and moral
decisionmaking.”).
76 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 94 (1991) (“Because there is no way to predict who future Justices will be or how
73
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prediction, we might conclude that stakeholders lack any effective means to
protect themselves against precedential swings. The result would be to bolster
the argument that principles of fairness require some degree of judicial
solicitude for reliance interests.
Anticipating the path of judicial precedent can undoubtedly be challenging.
Even seasoned students of the Court can have difficulty making accurate
forecasts, especially in the mid- to long-term. Nevertheless, the implications of
that difficulty should not be overstated. Not every precedent is situated
identically in terms of its probable durability. Certain precedents are plainly
more likely than others to be reconsidered and overruled.77 Relying on a
precedent like Marbury v. Madison78 that consistently draws the Court’s
esteem as a pillar of our constitutional order is a far safer bet than relying on a
recent, controversial decision that multiple sitting Justices have vowed to
dismantle.79
Further, though predicting the trajectory of precedent may be difficult, the
same is true of many other risks that confront us on a daily basis. A
homeowner faces risks from catastrophic weather events; she responds by
buying insurance. An investor faces risks from the instability of global
currency markets; she responds by buying derivatives. A global corporation
faces risks from civic instability in an emerging market; it responds with a
panoply of measures to hedge its economic exposure. None of these risks is
easy to gauge. Still, it would seem strange to contend that our homeowner,
investor, and corporation would have behaved in a reasonable and justifiable
fashion by throwing up their hands and refraining from taking any precautions
against uncertain events. For similar reasons, the fact that predicting judicial
overrulings is difficult falls short of furnishing a convincing justification for
protecting stakeholder reliance through the doctrine of stare decisis.80
they may interpret the ambiguities or develop the ideas in precedents, there is inevitably substantial uncertainty
over the direction of constitutional law.”).
77 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 43, at 525 (“The issue of whether a specific change can be anticipated is a
matter of degree.”).
78 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Gerhardt, Super Precedent, supra note 45, at 1208 (“Societal
acquiescence in Marbury, as a defense and authority for the exercise of judicial review of federal authorities, is
deeply engrained in the public consciousness and the fabric of American law.”).
79 See, e.g., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2492 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Were the matter up to me, I would vote to grant the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider Citizens
United or, at least, its application in this case.”).
80 Cf. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 47, 66 (1977) (“[E]fficiency may demand that persons expect changes in the law. In the market
context, only behavior that takes into account probabilities of change is treated as reasonable.”).
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3. Absence of Private Insurance Markets
Analogizing judicial overrulings to events such as natural disasters or
currency fluctuations elides a potentially important difference pertaining to the
availability of private insurance. As Jonathan Masur and Jonathan Nash
recently explained, “There exists no meaningful market for regulatory
insurance in the United States.”81 Whatever the explanations for that gap,82 the
fact remains that a stakeholder seeking to hedge against the risk of legal
change will generally need to look beyond established insurance markets. One
might conclude that the absence of such markets makes it unfair to penalize
stakeholders for failing to hedge against the prospect of adjudicative change.
Instead, in light of the unavailability of private insurance, precedential reliance
should be treated as de facto justifiable and worthy of protection.
The trouble with this argument is that, notwithstanding the lack of a private
insurance market, stakeholders may avail themselves of other measures to
mitigate their risk in the event of an overruling. Most obviously, they can
restrict the extent to which they make affirmative and calculated choices to
exploit favorable judicial decisions as a means of achieving objectives such as
profit maximization. Whether or not that restraint would lead to a suboptimal
level of investment in the aggregate—an issue that is taken up below83—it
dilutes the fairness justification for protecting reliance in situations where
stakeholders exercise discretion in determining how to respond to precedent.
4. Bounded Rationality
A different perspective on the fairness rationale emerges from the teachings
of behavioralist economics. Drawing on the insights of behavioralism, one
might contend that, even if the path of precedent is predictable in theory, many
individuals will misestimate the risk of detrimental legal change.84 Given the
deficiencies and biases that influence individuals’ processing of information
about the future, it is arguably misguided for the legal system to assume that
stakeholders will make rational and sensible predictions about the likelihood
81 Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 391, 408 (2010); see also id. (noting that there is “not even a market for insurance against government
takings (which would appear to be a much simpler endeavor)”).
82 Professors Masur and Nash argued that the most significant cause of the gap is the difficulty of pricing
insurance against regulatory change. See id. at 421–26.
83 See infra Part III.E.
84 See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 211, 221–25 (2003).
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and consequences of adjudicative change.85 And in light of these biases, it may
be unfair for courts to disregard precedential reliance based on the premise that
individuals can properly discount their reliance according to the probability
that judicial decisions will be overruled.
Again, however, the reach of this argument is limited. Even if bounded
rationality and limited cognitive capacity impede stakeholders from precisely
forecasting the risk and consequences of overrulings, stakeholders remain
capable of recognizing that certain precedents—such as those that recently
issued from a closely divided Court—are more likely candidates for
reconsideration. Treating all precedential reliance as reasonable ventures
beyond the justifications provided by behavioralism. In addition, as Kyle
Logue has explained, there is a plausible argument that certain stakeholders
(such as business corporations and sophisticated individuals) will tend to make
decisions that approach the rational-actor ideal.86 That prospect chips away
further at the behavioralist justification for protecting reliance on precedent.
These limitations suggest the more general point that, while the lessons of
behavioralism might support targeted decisions to protect some types of
reliance on grounds of fairness, they cannot justify the across-the-board
protection of reliance reflected in contemporary stare decisis jurisprudence.
5. Immutable Obligations of Government
That leaves what is perhaps the most intuitive argument for the protection
of precedential reliance on fairness grounds: when stakeholders take actions in
compliance with existing law as declared by the Supreme Court, the Court is
obliged to protect that reliance in order to avoid “inequity.”87 This obligation
cannot be disclaimed through a general warning that all precedents are subject
to reconsideration. Treating citizens fairly requires giving effect to their
compliance efforts notwithstanding the well-known reality that judicial
interpretations can change.
Whether or not this argument is sound as a general matter, it is ill suited to
the context of stare decisis. If one believes that citizens have an absolute right
85 See id. at 224 (“Arguments that seek to justify one transition norm over another on the basis of the
relative ex ante incentive effects are significantly limited by the behavioralists’ findings.”).
86 See id. at 228 (“There are reasons to believe that over the long run the decisions of corporate managers
and of business decision-makers generally tend to be rational in the traditional sense; that is, they tend not to
be subject to the same biases that plague individuals acting in their capacities as consumers, at least not to the
same degree.”).
87 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
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to rely on existing law—a right that the government, including the courts,
cannot prevent from arising through an ex ante disclaimer of fidelity to the
past—the protection of precedential reliance via the doctrine of stare decisis
seems like a curious remedy. Reliance by stakeholders does not guarantee that
a flawed precedent will be retained.88 Under existing law, reliance interests can
be overcome by the countervailing benefits of interpreting the law correctly.
There is thus no inalienable right to rely on precedent. To the contrary, the
protection of reliance is contingent; it can always be subordinated to other
values. That leads to a doctrinal middle ground in which fairness justifications
require reliance on precedent to receive some judicial respect even though
stakeholders have been warned that precedent can change, but nevertheless
allow stakeholder reliance to be trumped by countervailing considerations.
Perhaps a convincing explanation for this approach is possible. But if it is, the
Court has not yet articulated it.
The conceptual terrain would be different if judicial decisions were viewed
as creating vested rights in stakeholders that could not be undermined without
the payment of compensation. That prospect is particularly intriguing in light
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.89 In Stop the Beach
Renourishment, a four-Justice plurality indicated that a judicial ruling could
violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it amounts to
“elimination of established private property rights.”90 The full sweep of the
plurality’s reasoning is not yet clear.91 For present purposes, the key takeaway
is that where a party does, in fact, have an “established private property
right[]”92 that would be eliminated by an overruling but compensated as a
taking, the discussion of protecting reliance interests through the doctrine of
stare decisis is less salient: even if an overruling occurs, the parties who are
affected most directly will receive payment for their losses.93 The difficult
88 Cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that “reliance alone may not always carry the day”).
89 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
90 Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
91 For an interesting and provocative effort at extending the Stop the Beach Renourishment rationale, see
Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 556 (2012), which argued that
“anyone affected by particular kinds of adverse legal rulings, whether a party to the primary litigation or not,
should be able to sue courts for the effects of the decision, with compensation to be provided by the state.”
92 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
93 This is one of the concerns raised by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in which he suggested that the
knowledge that aggrieved parties would be made whole might lead courts to be aggressive in changing the
law. See id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The idea . . . that a
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question for the doctrine of stare decisis is how to conceptualize stakeholder
interests whose diminution would not require compensation following a
judicial overruling.94 Why do those interests warrant judicial protection, and at
what point should they yield to countervailing concerns?
C. Rule of Law
Another potential basis for protecting precedential reliance is grounded
directly in the rule of law. By giving regard to citizens’ attempts to comply
with the legal boundaries and mandates in force at any particular time, the
judiciary can help to infuse the law with “qualit[ies] of clarity, certainty,
predictability, [and] trustworthiness.”95 Those qualities, in turn, serve the ruleof-law ideal.96 They are thus worthy of protection “not only [due to] the
desirability of minimizing tangible forms of harm and economic loss,” but also
for their “own sake.”97
The implicit claim is that a certain amount of continuity is necessary in
order for a legal system to embody the rule of law.98 The converse situation, in
which dramatic vacillation is the ordinary course, lacks the requisite stability
of a sound legal system.99 Nor can the problem be rectified through public
notice that all laws are subject to change.100 Even if the legal system’s
architects—including its judges—disclaim any fidelity to the past, ceaseless
and pervasive overhaul of the legal order cannot be squared with the stable

judicial takings doctrine would constrain judges might just well have the opposite effect. It would give judges
new power and new assurance that changes in property rights that are beneficial, or thought to be so, are fair
and proper because just compensation will be paid.”).
94 Cf. id. at 2615 (juxtaposing governmental takings against “the type of incremental modification under
state common law that does not violate due process, as owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to
make certain changes in property law”).
95 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 272 (2d ed. 2011).
96 See supra Part I.
97 FINNIS, supra note 95, at 272.
98 See id. at 270 (arguing that “[a] legal system exemplifies the Rule of Law to the extent” that, among
other things, “its rules are sufficiently stable to allow people to be guided by their knowledge of the content of
the rules”); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 79 (Yale Univ. rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that the “internal
morality of the law . . . demands that laws should not be changed too frequently”).
99 See FULLER, supra note 98, at 39 (describing as a “route[] to disaster” the maintenance of a system that
“introduc[es] such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them”).
100 Cf. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000) (“There is plainly a fundamental fairness interest, even
apart from any claim of reliance or notice, in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to
govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.”).
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core that the rule of law requires.101 The objective is as much to constrain
governmental action as it is to protect individual actors.
While the rule-of-law argument for protecting reliance is powerful in
theory, it loses much of its resonance in its practical application to modern
American law. The dynamics of legal change at institutions like the U.S.
Supreme Court bear little resemblance to a state of perpetual overhaul.102 The
Court continually underscores the respect that is due to past decisions. Even
when it opts to overrule a prior case, the Court commonly describes itself as
committed to incrementalism by narrowing the scope of its reversal of
course.103 Provided that the modern practice continues, and that adjudicative
change does not become so frequent and dramatic as to threaten the legal
system’s core stability, the Court’s failure to protect the interests of
stakeholders who relied on a given precedent would not seem to present a
serious challenge to the rule of law. Though a tendency toward constant
vacillation and revolutionary change might create serious rule-of-law concerns,
occasional overrulings can be compatible with a system dedicated to the rule of
law even if they work to the detriment of particular stakeholders.104
D. Judicial Identity
A rational actor who is serious about forecasting legal developments must
take into account a variety of considerations, not the least of which are changes
101 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (“There is . . . a point beyond
which frequent overruling would overtax the country’s belief in the Court’s good faith.”). The Casey Court
was attempting to make a point about the Court’s perceived legitimacy, though it seems to me that the impact
of frequent overruling on the rule of law is the more relevant concern.
102 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1156 (2008) (“[T]he Justices feel constrained from overturning too
many past decisions—however loose the notion of ‘too many’ might be—by an apprehension that the public
would find too much instability in constitutional law to be unacceptable.”).
103 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (altering the rationale for resolving
Confrontation Clause disputes but noting that “the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present
case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated
in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It
does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”). Of course, the articulated limitations can sometimes be exceeded fairly quickly.
Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 n.9 (2004) (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us,
and we express no opinion on them.”), with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (“We hold
that . . . the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines.”).
104 See Waldron, supra note 29, at 26 (“[I]n no context does the rule of law dictate immutability. But the
rule of law does counsel against too-frequent changes in the law, and this applies as much to precedent as to
other sources of law.”).
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in judicial personnel. The likelihood that the Supreme Court will overrule a
given precedent fluctuates as Justices of different backgrounds, ideologies, and
predispositions come and go.105 It would be foolhardy for a stakeholder to
ignore the Court’s composition in attempting to predict the path of judicial
decisions. The corollary is that if the Court were to treat precedential reliance
as worthy of protection only where it was the product of reasonable judgments,
the need presumably would arise for evaluating whether stakeholders properly
adjusted their views of certain precedents upon the arrival of new Justices to
the bench. It is easy to see why the Court might find this prospect—that is, the
need to declare that Justice B’s confirmation should have been understood as
the death knell for certain decisions joined by Justice A, whom Justice B
replaced—to be uncomfortable.106
By treating all precedential reliance as justifiable and worthy of protection,
the Court avoids the need for parsing the impact of judicial identity. All
stakeholders are deemed to have behaved reasonably by acting as though
existing law would remain valid in perpetuity. When stakeholders are released
from the obligation to consider the effects of individual Justices’ departures
and arrivals, the Court is too. The treatment of reliance as de facto reasonable
might likewise be viewed as reinforcing the principle that ours is a society
ruled by laws rather than the particular women and men who don judicial
robes, connecting the subjugation of judicial identity with the rule-of-law
considerations discussed above.107
But doctrinal disregard for judicial identity cannot render that factor
irrelevant in practice. So long as the Justices are empowered to deviate from
precedent when they perceive a compelling reason for doing so, judicial
identity will remain a driver of adjudicative change.108 Rational stakeholders
105

See GERHARDT, supra note 74, at 11 (discussing the correlation between personnel changes and
overrulings).
106 Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 66 (1994) (“The perception that judicial decisions are grounded in
principle and not politics may be undermined if [inferior] courts . . . routinely based their predictions on
hunches concerning how particular Justices would decide a legal issue given their basic political ideologies
and perceived agenda.”).
107 See, e.g., In re Concerned Corporators of the Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 525 A.2d 671, 701 (N.H. 1987)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases
becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.”).
108 See GERHARDT, supra note 74, at 11 (noting the “rarity of the Court’s overturning a precedent without
a change in membership”); cf. Barry Cushman, The Securities Laws and the Mechanics of Legal Change, 95
VA. L. REV. 927, 928 (2009) (discussing the “strand of positive constitutional theory that contends that judicial
appointments are the means by which constitutional revolutions . . . have been achieved”).
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will be cognizant of this fact, and they will continue to view the path of
precedent as bound up with judicial identity. That creates something of a
dilemma for the Court as an institution. On one hand, reducing the durability of
precedent to “a prediction of how the particular individuals sitting on
the . . . court would resolve the issue presented” puts pressure on the vision of
the law as transcending the proclivities of individual jurists.109 On the other
hand, it is beyond question that the probability that a given precedent will be
overruled depends in part on judicial personnel. However understandable the
impulse, the desire to downplay judicial identity is a dubious justification for
treating all precedential reliance as worthy of judicial protection.
E. Optimal Investment
Viewed from the ex ante perspective, the protection of precedential reliance
might be defended as a mechanism for promoting social welfare by
encouraging an efficient level of investment. The argument has two premises.
First, the threat of adjudicative change is problematic because it inhibits
investments that may be impaired by a shift in the legal backdrop. Second,
those inhibitions can be mitigated through the doctrine of stare decisis. By
resisting the overruling of precedents that have engendered substantial
expenditures in reliance, the Supreme Court can provide comfort to
prospective investors notwithstanding the looming possibility of judicial
reconsideration.110
Neither premise is beyond dispute. At the outset, it is unclear that
disregarding reliance expectations would lead to a suboptimal level of
investment. In a world where precedential reliance received no regard from the
courts, stakeholders would not be completely paralyzed by the threat of
overruling. Rather, they would attempt to discount their reliance based on the
perceived risk that today’s precedent might subsequently be overturned.
Perhaps stakeholders would tend to discount too heavily, or perhaps they
would tend to discount too lightly.111 In either event, a more developed theory

109 Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 685 (1995) (also noting that
“[t]his conception is inconsistent with central specific practices of American law—including the norm of the
impartial adjudicator”).
110 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 152 (2010)
(“Individuals and firms may have invested time, effort, and money based on [a judicial] decision. The more the
Court undermines this kind of reliance, the riskier investment becomes. The more the Court engages in a
practice that appears to ignore that reliance, the more the practice threatens economic prosperity.”).
111 See supra Part III.B.4.
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would be required to prove that the possibility of adjudicative change creates a
genuine problem for investment levels.
Indeed, it might be the case that under certain conditions, society is best
served by reducing parties’ incentives to invest in ways that are consistent with
existing precedent. As suggested by the work of commentators including Louis
Kaplow, it may sometimes be in society’s best interest for parties to reduce
their reliance on a legal requirement or standard of liability even before its
revision, so that the benefits associated with the new law (or new interpretation
of existing law) are brought about more quickly.112 Protecting precedential
reliance in those cases may prove counterproductive by diminishing private
incentives to avoid relying on troublesome precedents. And the insights of
behavioralism add another layer of complexity to the investment-incentives
story.113 If cognitive biases affect many stakeholders’ perceptions about the
risk of adjudicative change, the relationship between ex post treatment of
reliance interests and ex ante investment behaviors becomes still more
complicated and difficult to predict.114
Even if failing to protect reliance would lead to suboptimal levels of
investment, it is unclear whether judicial solicitude for reliance interests
represents an effective solution. The fact that a precedent has commanded
reliance does not insulate it from reconsideration or overruling. Reliance
implications remain subject to override in light of the countervailing benefits
associated with legal accuracy and evolution. Thus, a stakeholder who is
deciding how to invest in light of existing caselaw cannot assume that every
precedent that has generated reliance will be reaffirmed indefinitely. In a few
cases, the magnitude of reliance might give potential investors an unshakeable
112 See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 529–30; see also id. at 551 (“A policy of no mitigation does not . . . go
far enough in addressing the incentive problem in all cases. Sometimes new legal rules should be made fully
retroactive: they should be applied to time periods before the enactment date, even as to investments no longer
in existence.”). The link between ex ante incentives and assumptions about legal progress is critical to the
analysis of legal transitions. See Kaplow, supra note 55, at 191 (“[F]ailure to provide relief to manufacturers
when their product is banned will discourage production of the product ex ante. This effect is desirable if the
product is banned when in fact it is found to be dangerous. But if it is a beneficial product that will be banned,
the reduction in ex ante production is counterproductive.”); Logue, supra note 84, at 235 (“The economic
approach . . . is an anticipation-based argument; it depends specifically on the claim that, if private parties
expect law change to be applied retroactively, they will have an ex ante incentive to make investments in
anticipation of this change. For a large class of legal changes . . . such anticipatory moves on the part of private
actors will be desirable if and only if the law change in question is itself expected to be desirable . . . .”).
113 See supra Part III.B.4.
114 Cf. Logue, supra note 84, at 225 (“It seems likely that the same cognitive quirks that affect consumers’
assessments of product risks, and of risks more generally, will affect individuals’ guesses about the likelihood
of legal change, the nature of the change, and the way in which transition costs and benefits will be handled.”).
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feeling of comfort. To return to the Legal Tender Cases,115 stakeholders might
reasonably conclude that because the extent of reliance on paper money is so
great, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will find countervailing
considerations sufficient to justify an overruling. But in most cases
precedential reliance will be far more limited, leaving adjudicative change as a
realistic possibility. The marginal increase in investor confidence resulting
from the treatment of stakeholder expectations as worthy of presumptive,
though defeasible, respect is a thin reed on which to support the protection of
reliance interests.
F. Tradition
A final potential reason for affording protection to precedential reliance is
based on tradition and past practice: The Supreme Court has previously treated
reliance on precedent as a relevant factor in its stare decisis jurisprudence, so it
should continue to do so going forward.116 This argument need not go so far as
to consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis is itself entitled to formal stare
decisis effect.117 The point could simply be that the Court generally ought not
deviate from its past practices.
Even if one is inclined to accept the relevance of precedential reliance
based on past judicial practice, as an analytical matter it is still worth asking
what justifies the practice in the first place. Determining the import of reliance
interests in any given case requires the exercise of judgment and the weighing
of competing considerations. Those tasks will be affected by the underlying
rationale on which the protection of reliance is based. A deeper inquiry into the
justification for protecting reliance thus remains crucial.
IV. FROM RELIANCE TO DISRUPTION
The previous Part sought to demonstrate that the arguments for protecting
precedential reliance are susceptible to serious challenges. The foregoing
analysis does not prove, or attempt to prove, that the various rationales for
protecting reliance are beyond salvage. Instead, it suggests that important
ambiguities and uncertainties need to be addressed before the protection of
reliance can be persuasively justified on any of the asserted grounds.

115
116
117

See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part I (discussing the Court’s treatment of reliance interests).
On that question, see generally Paulsen, supra note 41.
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There is, however, an analytical reframing that provides a firmer basis for
protecting stakeholder expectations. That reframing, which is the topic of this
Part, shifts the doctrinal focus from backward-looking reliance to forwardlooking disruption.118
A. The Basics
Instead of being defended as a tool for promoting fairness, justice, or
optimal levels of investment, judicial attention to settled expectations can be
recast as a mechanism for controlling the disruptive costs of adjudicative
change going forward. The point is not to protect past reliance qua reliance—a
proposition that is controversial for the reasons I have discussed119—but rather
to manage the disruptive impacts of breaking from precedent and requiring
stakeholders to make corresponding adjustments.
Recasting the inquiry in terms of forward-looking disruption allows the
doctrine of stare decisis to move beyond the question of whether stakeholders
should have taken better precautions against the prospect of adjudicative
change.120 There is no longer any need to assess the reasonableness of
stakeholders’ conduct in determining whether norms of fairness require that
their expectations be protected. Viewed through the lens of disruption, past
expectations are protected only insofar as their undermining would impose
adjustment costs going forward.121 Past reliance becomes a presumptive proxy
for forward-looking disruption.122 This retheorization is informed by the reality
that change is inherently costly.123 Even beneficial changes require the
expenditure of resources—economic and otherwise—in order for stakeholders
to understand and comply with the new regime. Whether or not individual
stakeholders behaved reasonably in calibrating their past reliance, the
118

See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 63 (2001)
(“When a court overrules a particular precedent, it frequently generates some transition costs; among other
things, public and private actors must make investments to understand and conform to the new rule, and
money may have to be spent on litigation to refine and clarify it.”).
119 See supra Part III.
120 For a comparable focus on the forward-looking “adjustment costs” of deviating from precedent, see
Lee, supra note 39, at 663–64.
121 Cf. Epstein, supra note 68, at 72 (“It is not that individuals and firms are incapable of making
adjustments to changes in their legal environment. Rather, it is that they are required to incur the costs of so
doing.”).
122 Cf. Lee, supra note 39, at 664 (“If no decisions are made in reliance on a rule, then there are no
adjustment costs that flow from its replacement.”).
123 See Epstein, supra note 68, at 72 (“The time, expense, and uncertainty created by the development and
implementation of new legal rules should always tilt the scale in favor of the status quo.”).
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disruptiveness of change affects the net social gains from overruling a flawed
precedent.
The Supreme Court has immense power to initiate legal change, but limited
tools to manage it. The Court cannot supplement its decision to overrule a
precedent with an order that those who are helped by the decision must share
their windfall with those who are harmed.124 Nor can it depend on those who
benefit from legal changes to make voluntary payments to the losers in order to
dull the sting. Prospective overruling remains available for situations in which
the Court wishes to spare those who relied on past interpretations from the full
brunt of adjudicative change. But the Court has expressed disfavor toward that
approach.125 Moreover, prospective overruling is an incomplete solution, for it
provides no relief to those who made forward-looking investments on the
assumption that a certain legal rule would remain binding into the future.126
Notwithstanding these limitations, what the Court can do is infuse its
jurisprudence with a general preference for the status quo in order to reduce the
incidence of dramatic change and the corresponding occurrence of disruptive
impacts.127 Viewing the durability of precedent in these terms circumvents
difficult questions about whether stakeholders should have taken better
precautions to mitigate their losses in the event of a judicial overruling. The
focal point becomes the social costs of adjudicative change going forward.
In discussing the retroactive application of tax laws, the Supreme Court has
described the tax system as “a way of apportioning the cost of government

124 Cf. id. at 73 (suggesting that an ideal system of legal transitions might provide “side payments to
compensate the losers from the legal changes in question” to help ensure that “all legal changes were Pareto
efficient to the extent that government could make them so”).
125 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a rule of federal
law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events
predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”).
126 See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1994) (“An entirely prospective change in the law
may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to
be violative of due process.”); Graetz, supra note 80, at 77 (“[W]hile it has been argued that persons who
purchase tax-exempt bonds should be entitled to tax-free interest for the life of the bond, it has not been
suggested that issuers of tax-exempt bonds, who may well have structured their financing plans on the
expectation that the exempt status would continue into the future, are entitled to continuation of the tax
exemption because of their ‘reliance’ interest.”).
127 On the subordination of individual interests, consider the Court’s statement in Casey that “[h]owever
upsetting it may be to those most directly affected when one judicially derived rule replaces another, the
country can accept some correction of error without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court.”
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992).
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among” the citizenry.128 A comparable perspective applies to the operation of
stare decisis when the touchstone becomes forward-looking disruption instead
of backward-looking reliance. The doctrine of stare decisis is reframed as a
means of apportioning the costs of legal progress among the citizenry at large,
as opposed to a tool for promoting individualistic goals such as fair treatment
of particular actors. Sometimes the burdened parties are those who must
endure the continued operation of a suboptimal legal rule for the sake of
continuity. At other times, it is those who hoped for a precedent’s continued
vitality who must suffer the pains of an overruling. The shift toward disruption
emphasizes this vision of stare decisis as a public-minded instrument for
achieving wide-ranging social objectives.
B. Rethinking Specific Reliance
Twenty-one years ago the Supreme Court decided the case of Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, dealing with the extent of state power to impose tax-collection
obligations on mail-order sellers.129 Viewed through the lens of precedent, the
proper outcome seemed clear. The Court’s prior opinion in National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue had sided with sellers in comparable
circumstances.130 In the years since the decision in Bellas Hess was issued,
however, developments in related areas of constitutional law had arguably
rendered that case a doctrinal outlier.131 The question in Quill was whether the
Court would reaffirm Bellas Hess notwithstanding doubts about its soundness
by contemporary standards132 or overrule the case and enhance the internal
consistency of the Court’s jurisprudence.

128

Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1938).
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
130 386 U.S. 753 (1967); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (“This case, like [Bellas Hess], involves a State’s
attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State
to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State. In Bellas Hess we held that a similar
Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce.”).
131 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (“Our due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years
since Bellas Hess . . . .”); id. at 310 (“Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in the middle of this latest rally
between formalism and pragmatism [in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause].”).
132 Id. at 317; see also id. at 308 (“[T]o the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process
Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those
holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.”); id. at 311 (conceding that “contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time
today”).
129
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The Court chose the former course, opting for “adherence to settled
precedent” to an extent sufficient to preserve the Bellas Hess result.133 Along
with defending Bellas Hess’s application of the Commerce Clause as
adequately suited to its particular context, the Court noted the importance of
reliance expectations. It explained that mail-order sellers had expended
significant resources based on the Court’s previous articulation of the legal
landscape and that altering the rules could have threatened “the basic
framework of a sizable industry.”134 It also recognized that, because “[m]any
States have enacted use taxes,” a decision to abandon “Bellas Hess might raise
thorny questions concerning the retroactive application of those taxes and
might trigger substantial unanticipated liability for mail-order houses.”135
Quill provides a useful illustration of the concept of specific reliance on
precedent, meaning reliance in the form of direct action, such as spending
money and structuring business operations.136 The focus on tangible and
immediate harms constitutes the dominant paradigm of precedential reliance in
modern Supreme Court parlance. The Court asks whether stakeholders have
taken identifiable steps in reaction to the issuance of a precedent, and it
considers the reliance interests in deciding whether the precedent should be
retained.137 The goal is to protect the welfare of those who invested resources
based on the evident belief that a given precedent would remain binding into
the future.
The relevance of tangible, economic effects also finds expression in the
Court’s practice of according heightened deference to precedents that involve
property and contract rights.138 The received wisdom is that in those contexts,
“[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme”139 because “parties
133

Id. at 317.
Id.
135 Id. at 318 n.10 (citation omitted).
136 I discuss the distinction between specific and broader based reliance in Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis
as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 453–64 (2010).
137 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
138 See Lee, supra note 1, at 688–703 (surveying the historical support for this practice); id. at 699 (“By
the founding era, English courts and American commentators had embraced the notion of an enhanced rule of
stare decisis in cases involving rules of property. That principle also dominated the Court’s treatment of
precedent during the Taney era.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 844 (2009) (“Traditionally, precedent rules were significantly influenced
by reliance interests. In particular, stronger precedent rules were applied to property—and, sometimes,
commercial interests—based on the view that reliance in this area was greater.”).
139 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Lee, supra note 39, at 662 (“Enhanced
deference to rules of property may be understood to hinge on the prediction that the adjustment costs
associated with overturning precedents establishing such rules will be high.”); Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1553
134

KOZEL GALLEYSPROOFS1

1490

7/11/2013 1:53 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1459

may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct
transactions.”140 By contrast, where a precedent involves “procedural and
evidentiary rules,” reliance expectations have less resonance,141 for such rules
do “not alter primary conduct.”142
I have argued that it is not entirely clear why specific reliance should be
worthy of judicial solicitude. Neither the moral, pragmatic, nor economic basis
for protection is self-evident.143 But notwithstanding that uncertainty, specific
reliance can remain relevant as a potential indicator of forward-looking
disruption. The disruption-based account recognizes the forward-looking costs
that arise when stakeholders must modify their behaviors to accommodate a
changed legal order. Past instances of specific reliance are relevant to the
extent they increase the likelihood of forward-looking adjustments following a
judicial overruling. The driving concern is not with protecting individual
stakeholders in light of their previous expectations. The point, rather, is to
protect society at large from the aggregate costs of disruption.

(“Traditionally, [the reliance] factor is thought most apposite in the commercial context, where resources have
been committed and investments have been made in reliance on a legal rule or set of rules reflected in judicial
decisions.”).
140 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992) (“[T]he classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the
earlier rule occurs in the commercial context where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a
necessity . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924) (“The
[precedent was issued] twenty-three years ago and affected many tracts of land . . . . In the meantime there has
been . . . continuous growth and development [and] . . . . reliance on the decision. . . . It has become a rule of
property, and to disturb it now would be fraught with many injurious results.”); Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1851) (“The case of the Thomas Jefferson did not decide any question
of property, or lay down any rule by which the right of property should be determined. If it had, we should
have felt ourselves bound to follow it . . . . [f]or every one would suppose that after the decision of this court,
in a matter of that kind, he might safely enter into contracts, upon the faith that rights thus acquired would not
be disturbed.”).
This special concern with stability in matters of property, contracting, and commercial transactions is
not unique to the United States. See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (Eng.)
(noting “the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and
fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law”).
141 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
142 Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252 (1998); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816
(2009) (“Revisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where, as here, a departure would not upset
expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently adopted to improve the operation of
the courts, and experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”). But see Hohn, 524 U.S. at 259
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that although “procedural rules do not ordinarily engender detrimental
reliance,” in the present case “detrimental reliance by the Congress of the United States is self-evident”).
143 See supra Part III.
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C. The Systemic Turn
Tangible responses to precedent by directly impacted stakeholders are only
one aspect of the consequences of overruling. Reframing the inquiry in terms
of societal disruption highlights the need for a systemic perspective that
captures the ramifications of legal change for parties and institutions beyond
those who are immediately affected by a judicial reversal. The systemic
perspective could be applied even to backward-looking reliance by enlarging
the universe of expectations that are deemed relevant to the stare decisis
inquiry. But it gains additional resonance and clarity in the context of forwardlooking disruption.
On the disruption-based account, a central feature of adjudicative change is
the transition cost it is likely to impose going forward. That cost is not limited
to acts of specific reliance by individual stakeholders. Legal disturbances are
felt more broadly than that. They extend to other actors who operate at an
additional degree of remove from a particular precedent but whose actions and
understandings have nevertheless been influenced by the precedent in indirect
ways. As then-Judge John Roberts put it during his Supreme Court
confirmation hearing, overruling a precedent can cause “a jolt to the legal
system.”144 Intuitions like this inform the systemic perspective, which
recognizes that departures from precedent can create significant disruption
even when the specific, transactional effects are narrow in scope.145
Among the pertinent considerations from the systemic point of view are the
effects of adjudicative change for governmental actors, such as legislators and

144 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144 (2005) (statement of John Roberts, J.);
see also DUXBURY, supra note 52, at 123 (“The costs generated by the overruling of a precedent . . . might be
significant: public bodies and private citizens might have to invest heavily to understand and conform to the
new ruling, and may even have to litigate in order to force the courts to make the ruling clearer or more
refined.”); Lee, supra note 39, at 652 (“When the Court adopts a newly restrictive conception of governmental
power or a newly expansive conception of individual rights, it may threaten institutions that are built around
the presumed validity of the current precedential regime.”).
145 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 138, at 838 (arguing that to overrule “entrenched”
constitutional precedents could “harm people’s attachment to their understanding of the Constitution—an
attachment which helps unify the nation”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988) (“Stability and continuity of political institutions (and of
shared values) are important goals of the process of constitutional adjudication, particularly ‘in a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.’”
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819))).

KOZEL GALLEYSPROOFS1

1492

7/11/2013 1:53 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1459

executive officials.146 Those actors necessarily operate against the backdrop of
judicial precedent.147 Overrulings require government officials to spend their—
that is, our—time and resources formulating new approaches.148 Transition
costs arise regardless of whether judicial overrulings are understood as everpresent possibilities. Even legislators who foresaw the possibility of a statute’s
undermining via a revision to the web of relevant judicial precedents may need
to invest additional resources to craft a subsequent statute that satisfies the
newly announced doctrinal requirements.149
The systemic costs of disruption can also accrue to society in a more
elliptical fashion. Onlookers who are not directly affected by a substantive rule
nevertheless may need to alter their understandings of the legal regime’s
content and operation.150 As Michael Dorf has noted, cases like New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan151 and Brown v. Board of Education152 “have come to
146 Cf. Lee, supra note 39, at 701 (“[W]hen constitutional decisions establish the framework for other laws
and governmental institutions, reversal of such decisions would give rise to substantial adjustment costs as
public and private actors are forced to restructure the laws and institutions that are built around the abandoned
regime.”).
147 The Supreme Court occasionally discusses legislative reliance in applying its doctrine of stare decisis.
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (Breyer, J.) (“Buckley has promoted considerable
reliance. Congress and state legislatures have used Buckley when drafting campaign finance laws.”); Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567–68 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Legislatures and their constituents have
relied upon [the precedent under discussion] to exercise control over sentencing through dozens of statutes like
the one the Court approved in that case. . . . We see no reason to overturn those statutes or cast uncertainty
upon the sentences imposed under them.” (citations omitted)); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (“Legislators and district courts nationwide have modified their practices—or, rather,
reembraced the traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before the 1990 census—
in response to [the precedent under discussion].”); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)
(“Stare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm,
have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge
settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response.”); cf. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 261
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that adherence to precedent was justified in part by “the reliance of Congress
upon an unrepudiated decision central to the procedural scheme it was creating”).
148 Cf. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“While reliance is most
important in ‘cases involving property and contract rights,’ the Court has recognized that reliance by law
enforcement officers is also entitled to weight.” (citation omitted) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828 (1991))); id. (“The Belton rule has been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century.”).
149 See Gerhardt, supra note 76, at 86–87 (addressing how “the Court’s decisions can shape the elected
branches’ agendas”).
150 See Monaghan, supra note 145, at 750 (noting that the expectations created by precedent can be
“symbolic” as well as “tangible”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69 (1996) (“Official pronouncements about law—from the national
legislature and the Supreme Court—have an expressive function. They communicate social commitments and
may well have major social effects just by virtue of their status as communication.” (footnote omitted)).
151 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
152 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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stand for more than the legal doctrines they announced . . . . [by] symboliz[ing]
the association in the public imagination of the Constitution with core ideals of
liberty and equality.”153 Overruling such cases would carry intellectual and
psychological consequences as well as tangible ones, creating the need for
forward-looking adjustments to behaviors and mentalities.
The Supreme Court occasionally directs its gaze toward these broader
implications of change. Consider Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,154 where the Court reaffirmed the “central holding” of
Roe v. Wade155 that only at the point of fetal viability does the “State’s interest
in fetal life” permit the prohibition of nontherapeutic abortions.156 The Court
based its decision in part on reliance interests: “[P]eople have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves
and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail.”157 This attention to self-definition and
shared understandings about the meaning of the constitutional order suggests
an underlying concern with systemic impacts.158 But despite the sweep of its
depiction of reliance and its departure from the classic focus on tangible
activities and investment-backed expectations, the Casey Court stopped short
of fully elucidating the contours of systemic disruption.159
A comparable approach was on display in Dickerson v. United States.160 In
declining to repudiate Miranda v. Arizona161 and its requirement of preinterrogation warnings for criminal suspects, the Dickerson Court noted that

153

Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2030 (2012) (book review).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
155 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
157 Id. at 856; see also id. (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. . . . [W]hile the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.”).
158 See id. at 855 (describing as relevant the question whether Roe’s “limitation on state power could be
removed without . . . significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it”); id. at 860 (“An entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society, and to make reproductive decisions . . . .”).
159 The Court’s failure to elaborate prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to criticize its theory of reliance as
“undeveloped and totally conclusory.” Id. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). The Chief Justice also argued that “[i]n the end, having failed to put forth any evidence to
prove any true reliance, the joint opinion’s argument is based solely on generalized assertions about the
national psyche.” Id. at 957.
160 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
161 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154
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Miranda is such a staple of “routine police practice” that its “warnings have
become part of our national culture.”162 The Court’s focus seemed to be on
what Michael Gerhardt has called Miranda’s “network effects” within the law
enforcement community, the political sector, and the public at large.163 As in
Casey, however, the apparent invocation of these systemic effects was left
without much elaboration.
The same type of abbreviated discussion occurred in Lawrence v. Texas,
which rejected Bowers v. Hardwick164 and invalidated a criminal prohibition
against sexual relations between members of the same gender.165 The
Lawrence Court reasoned that “there has been no individual or societal reliance
on Bowers” sufficient to warrant preserving it.166 Justice Scalia responded in
dissent by articulating a capacious—and quintessentially systemic—view of
the implicated reliance interests: “Countless judicial decisions and legislative
enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s
belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a
rational basis for regulation.”167 Lawrence thus serves as another illustration of
issues of systemic reliance bubbling to the surface of Supreme Court discourse,
though neither Justice Scalia nor the Lawrence majority devoted significant
attention to the status and implications of systemic effects.
For a final example of precedential reliance being defined broadly to
encompass systemic concerns, consider a recent opinion by Justice Breyer. In
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court overruled a
longstanding precedent in the field of antitrust law that had categorically
prohibited resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturers and
distributors.168 Justice Breyer dissented, advocating the retention of the
previous rule.169 He described the operation of resale price agreements as a
complex issue whose impact was too uncertain to justify a break from
longstanding precedent.170

162

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
GERHARDT, supra note 74, at 185.
164 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
165 539 U.S. at 578.
166 Id. at 577.
167 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168 551 U.S. 877, 881, 907 (2007).
169 See id. at 908–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 See id. at 920 (concluding that economic “studies at most may offer some mild support for the
majority’s position. . . . [but] cannot constitute a major change in circumstances”).
163
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Justice Breyer evaluated a panoply of factors that have appeared in the
Supreme Court’s discussions of stare decisis.171 Included among those factors
were reliance considerations. He identified instances of specific reliance on the
previous resale price maintenance rule, such as strategic decisions by certain
types of businesses.172 He also looked beyond those businesses to reliance by a
host of other stakeholders: courts that had resolved disputes under the previous
rule; lawyers who advised clients about the rule’s application; shopping malls
that were built in light of assumptions about the economic prospects of
discount distributors; and even homeowners who had “taken a home’s distance
from . . . a mall into account.”173 Justice Breyer also recounted legislative
efforts, which he described in terms of “public reliance,” that were “premised
upon” the previous rule’s continued existence.174 Perhaps most interestingly,
he ventured into the realm of psychological expectations and understandings
by citing the effects on producers, distributors, and consumers who had come
to view the bar on resale price maintenance as a “legally guaranteed way of
life.”175
The conception of reliance evident in Justice Breyer’s dissent faces a
serious analytical challenge. Why, one might ask, shouldn’t the affected
individuals and institutions have taken suitable precautions in light of the
possibility that the Supreme Court might someday change its mind?176 Upon
recasting the driving rationale in terms of forward-looking disruption, this
challenge becomes more manageable. Even if the prospect of change is
foreseeable, its occurrence can be disruptive. Legislators are not spared the
additional effort of crafting a new regulatory regime simply because they
always recognized that the Court might alter the legal backdrop. Nor are
manufacturers and retailers spared the need to consider reorganizing their
operations. Formulating a thoughtful contingency plan will make it easier for
an individual or organization to cope with legal change, but it will not
eliminate all the transition costs of conforming to a new judicial mandate once
it is issued.

171

See id. at 923–29.
See id. at 925 (“[W]hole sectors of the economy have come to rely upon the per se rule. . . . The
Consumer Federation of America tells us that large low-price retailers would not exist without [the precedent
that was overruled] . . . . New distributors, including internet distributors, have similarly invested time, money,
and labor in an effort to bring yet lower cost goods to Americans.”).
173 Id. at 918, 925–26.
174 Id. at 919–20.
175 Id. at 926.
176 See supra Part III.
172
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The relationship between precedent and societal understandings likewise
could profit from being recast in terms of disruption. Return to the example of
Roe v. Wade. Despite the collective understanding that Roe might someday be
overturned, its actual overruling undoubtedly would prove disruptive. Apart
from the obvious effects on individual behaviors and the likelihood of
extensive administrative and legislative responses, widespread understandings
about the content of the legal backdrop would need to adapt.
The same type of analysis applies to the overruling of Miranda. Even for
those who will never be detained as criminal suspects, the repudiation of the
familiar litany of warnings would require an updated understanding about a
core feature of criminal procedure. The overturning of a well-established
precedent like Miranda might also fuel more generalized doubts about the
stability and constancy of the legal order.177 That, too, is a disruptive
consequence of change. Of course, many onlookers would nevertheless
welcome the overruling of Miranda and applaud the Court’s willingness to
rectify a perceived constitutional mistake. But regardless of whether the net
effects of an overruling are deemed to be beneficial, adjudicative change
remains a potentially disruptive force. The threshold step is ensuring that the
disruptive impacts of an overruling are properly identified and understood.
V. ADJUDICATING DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS
Parts III and IV contended that judicial concern with stakeholder
expectations can profitably be reframed in terms of forward-looking
disruption, and that the move toward disruption emphasizes the importance of
adopting a systemic view of adjudicative change. The remaining question is
how to integrate those principles into a workable doctrine of stare decisis. This
Part sketches the outline of an answer. It begins by resisting the argument that
assessing disruption is beyond the competence of the courts. It then offers a
brief case study based on the Supreme Court’s debate over precedent in
Citizens United v. FEC.178 The Part concludes with a few words about the
disruptiveness of legal changes that are initiated outside the judiciary, as well
as the place of the disruption inquiry within the broader doctrine of stare
decisis.

177 Cf. Peters, supra note 36, at 2114 (“In areas of the law with high visibility—free speech, equal
protection, and abortion cases come to mind—slapdash application of supposedly immutable constitutional
provisions would undermine public confidence in the courts.”).
178 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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A. The Objection from Institutional Competence
At the outset, we must consider whether assessing the disruptive impacts of
adjudicative change is even within the competence of the courts. A negative
answer would be reason enough to exclude those impacts from the doctrine of
stare decisis.
The institutional competence concern is especially resonant for the
systemic view of disruption. It is initially daunting to contemplate the
aggregate disruption that overruling a precedent might generate. Yet it is worth
probing deeper, for the fact that systemic effects are “inchoate”179 does not
make them any “less real.”180 Systemic considerations might be evaluated
through means short of quantifying them with mathematical precision. Indeed,
if algorithmic expression were the standard, even the classic case of specific
reliance in the form of economic investments would often pose insurmountable
obstacles to judicial assessment.181
Despite the impossibility of exactitude, both the specific and systemic
dimensions of adjudicative change are amenable to judicial analysis.182 It is
possible for the Supreme Court to predict that overruling a landmark case
might require extensive responses by private stakeholders as well as regulatory
and legislative bodies. It may likewise be possible to conclude that many
onlookers who have no direct connection to a precedent would need to update
their understandings of the legal backdrop if the precedent were overruled.
And it may even be possible to view the combination of these effects as
suggesting a marginal reduction in the stability of the legal equilibrium,
thereby affecting broad norms of constancy, dependability, and the rule of
law.183 A court will never be able to express these disruptive impacts with

179

Barnett, supra note 42, at 266 (“The problem with the reliance argument is not with its validity, but
that it is usually applied much too broadly to cases where people have ‘relied’ in much too inchoate a sense.”).
180 Nelson, supra note 118, at 63; cf. Lee, supra note 1, at 702 (“If private investment in contract and
property interests is sufficient to demand adherence to arguably erroneous precedent, public investment in
governmental structures should produce a similar effect.”).
181 On the concept of specific reliance, see supra Part IV.B.
182 Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158
(1990) (“The previous decision on the subject may be clearly incorrect but nevertheless have become so
embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and public
expectations of individuals and institutions, that the result should not be changed now. This is a judgment
addressed to the prudence of a court, but it is not the less valid for that.”).
183 See DUXBURY, supra note 52, at 162 (“When courts decide consistently on the same facts they not
only provide us with important information for the purposes of organizing our individual affairs but also make
it more likely that citizens generally will negotiate the legal system with confidence . . . .”).
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absolute precision. It may, however, conclude that the effects are likely to be
minor, moderate, or extreme, and it may strive to understand the myriad ways
in which disruption is likely to occur.184 That type of rough accounting is not
perfect, but it is useful in capturing the disruptive costs to be weighed against
the benefits of overruling a dubious precedent.
Steven Calabresi has advanced a very different argument for revising the
doctrine of stare decisis based on considerations of institutional competence.185
Professor Calabresi questioned the ability of courts to “[a]ssess[] the costs to
society associated with retaining a precedent and weigh[] those costs against
the reliance interests . . . that a precedent may have generated.”186 That sort of
enterprise, he argued, is “much more within the competence of the political
branches of the federal government than it is within the competence of the
Supreme Court.”187 To translate these principles into practice, Professor
Calabresi advocated a revised approach to precedent whereby courts refrain
from invoking stare decisis in cases where a decision is challenged by the
Executive or Legislative Branches.188
Though Professor Calabresi’s criticisms have force, I harbor doubts about
outfitting the political branches with the power to determine which judicial
precedents are settled.189 It is sensible for courts to give careful consideration
to any data the government proffers regarding the consequences of overruling a
precedent. It may even be sensible for courts to adopt a posture of deference
toward the government’s empirical judgments made in light of such data. But
the choice to retain or overrule a dubious precedent requires both diagnosis of
a substantive error and appraisal of the error’s legally relevant implications.
184 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 925–26 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (offering a useful illustration of such an approach, albeit one couched primarily in the backwardlooking language of reliance rather than the forward-looking language of disruption).
185 See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative
Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
311, 340–45 (2005).
186 Id. at 340. Among the reasons Professor Calabresi offered was that “the political branches . . . have
much better institutional tools for assessing the twin empirical questions of: 1) what costs is a precedent
currently imposing on society and 2) to what extent have reliance interests grown up around a precedent
suggesting it ought to be retained.” Id. at 341.
187 Id. at 340.
188 See id. at 344 (“[O]n the empirical and policy question of whether the benefits of overturning a
precedent outweigh the reliance interests engendered by that precedent the Supreme Court ought always to
defer to the judgment of politically elected officials . . . unless those democratically accountable officials can
be shown to have acted irrationally.”).
189 See id. (arguing that “the coordinate, coequal, political branches of government are constitutionally
entitled to force the Supreme Court to rule on the merits and not to fall back on the policy of stare decisis”).
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The process of identifying the “costs [that] a precedent is currently imposing
on society”190 requires a threshold determination of which costs are legally
relevant—in other words, of what makes an erroneous precedent harmful.191
Such inquiries are properly charged to the judiciary in the post-Marbury192
world.
Judicial assessments of the net effects of deviating from precedent may be
informed by the same types of evidence of disruptive impact that Congress
would utilize in making its own determination. Yet the ultimate comparison of
the value of settlement versus the value of adjudicative change is better left to
the courts as a component of “[t]he judicial Power” that they are charged with
exercising.193
B. The Systemic Perspective as Applied: The Case of Citizens United
In exploring the implications of the shift from reliance to disruption and the
attendant adoption of a systemic perspective, an additional example will be
helpful. The Supreme Court recently provided a fascinating illustration of
precedent in action in Citizens United v. FEC.194 The case represents a
significant, controversial, and eminently debatable decision to depart from
settled law.
Citizens United was a remarkable case in numerous respects. It generated
significant popular criticism and legislative reform efforts,195 not to mention a
prime-time, face-to-face scolding during the State of the Union address.196 The
case dealt mainly with the regulation of political speech, but principles of stare
decisis also played a prominent role. To set the stage: In Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld a ban on using corporate treasury

190

Id. at 341.
See generally Kozel, supra note 50.
192 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
193 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
194 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
195 See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30 (“With a single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust
politics back to the robber-baron era of the 19th century.”).
196 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507,
531 (2012) (“Barack Obama not only denounced the Court’s opinion in Citizens United, he did so in front of
several Justices.”); Friedman, supra note 13, at 39 (“Citizens United serves only to underscore the sort of
publicity explicit overruling of important precedents can engender. The case was front-page news virtually
everywhere.”).
191
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expenditures to endorse or oppose candidates for state office.197 That decision
was based largely on “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form.”198 When it reconsidered the issue in 2010, the Citizens United Court
flatly rejected Austin. A divided Court dismissed the notion that “political
speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”199 While the
“[g]overnment may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and
disclosure requirements,” the Court reasoned, “it may not suppress that speech
altogether.”200
Despite its decision to expressly overrule a relatively recent precedent, the
majority in Citizens United offered only a brief discussion of stare decisis,
leaving a fuller exposition to Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence.201 But
what the majority did say was noteworthy. Most intriguingly, and true to the
tenor of prior debates over precedent,202 the majority asked whether the
protection of reliance expectations might justify abiding by Austin
notwithstanding that opinion’s wrongness on the merits.203 The majority
answered in the negative. It found that “[n]o serious reliance interests are at
stake,” a fact that distinguished Austin from “property and contract cases,
where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order
to conduct transactions.”204 The majority also downplayed the role of
legislative reliance. Though it acknowledged that “[l]egislatures may have
enacted bans on corporate expenditures believing that those bans were
constitutional,” it concluded that such reliance is “not a compelling interest for
stare decisis.”205 To rule otherwise would be to allow “legislative acts [to]
prevent us from overruling our own precedents, thereby interfering with our
duty ‘to say what the law is.’”206

197

494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
Id. at 660; see also id. (reasoning that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is
deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political
contributions”).
199 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 920–24 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
202 See supra Part I.
203 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
198
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As for the Chief Justice, he depicted Austin as a contested “aberration” that
itself represented a departure from settled law.207 He also criticized Austin as
embodying the “destabilizing” proposition that the government may prohibit
“political speech by a category of speakers in the name of equality.”208 And he
characterized the Solicitor General’s attempt to defend Austin on a new
rationale—that is, a rationale the Austin Court had not itself adopted—as
undermining any claim that Austin was entitled to deference.209 According to
the Chief Justice, “There is . . . no basis for the Court to give precedential sway
to reasoning that it has never accepted.”210 That statement echoed a similar
point raised by the majority but phrased in the milder terms of “diminished”
deference for precedents that are defended on novel rationales.211
Writing in partial dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the reliance interests
that are relevant to the stare decisis inquiry are not limited to “personal rights
involving property or contract.”212 To the contrary, the implicated interests
include “the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective
and coherent fashion.”213 In the case at hand, Justice Stevens deemed it
significant that state legislatures and Congress had relied on the distinction
between corporate and individual speakers that was embraced in Austin in
crafting their campaign finance laws.214 He also contended that “[b]y removing
one of its central components, today’s ruling makes a hash out of [the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s] ‘delicate and interconnected regulatory
scheme.’”215
Compared to the majority opinion and the Chief Justice’s concurrence,
Justice Stevens’s partial dissent ascribed greater import to the consequences of
deviating from precedent for parties beyond those directly affected by the
Austin rule. Even so, his position would have been bolstered by a more
comprehensive account of Austin’s systemic effects, as well as a reorientation
207

Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 922.
209 See id. at 924 (“To be clear: The Court in Austin nowhere relied upon the only arguments the
Government now raises to support that decision.”).
210 Id. Chief Justice Roberts added that “the Government’s new arguments must stand or fall on their own;
they are not entitled to receive the special deference we accord to precedent.” Id.
211 Id. at 912 (majority opinion) (“When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle
of adhering to that precedent through stare decisis is diminished.”).
212 Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213 Id.
214 Id.; see also id. at 930 (“The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction
between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin . . . .”).
215 Id. at 940 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 172 (2003)).
208
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from backward-looking reliance to forward-looking disruption. Assuming
Austin’s incorrectness on the substantive merits, the most straightforward
argument for retaining it is not that legislators and citizens previously took
actions in reliance upon its future validity. As explained above, whether such
reliance deserves judicial solicitude is a complex and debatable question.216
The more powerful rationale is that the Court’s jettisoning of Austin would
undoubtedly require extensive modification to behaviors and understandings
going forward. In the legislative sphere, the departure from Austin requires a
new approach to campaign finance regulation that is constructed around
disclosures and disclaimers rather than expenditure bans. This is true
regardless of whether state and federal legislative officials should have
foreseen the overruling of Austin as a realistic possibility when they were
engaged in their previous efforts to regulate campaign finance. Further, the
First Amendment transition brought about by Citizens United carried effects
for society at large. Onlookers whose conduct and investments were not
directly affected by the rejection of Austin nevertheless were required to
process a meaningful change to the content of the legal backdrop governing
political elections, an issue that touches the lives of all Americans. That, too, is
a transition cost of adjudicative change.
It does not necessarily follow that these considerations should have
precluded the overruling of Austin. The resolution of that issue depends on the
relationship between the benefits of overruling Austin and the disruptive
effects it would create. Whatever the proper result in the ultimate reckoning,
the foregoing discussion of Citizens United illustrates the type of inquiry that is
called for by a systemic approach to the disruption caused by adjudicative
reversals.
C. Change, Adjudicative and Otherwise
A modification of the legal order can carry destabilizing effects regardless
of the precipitating actor—be it a court, legislature, or administrative
agency.217 The frequency with which legal changes are initiated by the
Executive and Legislative Branches makes it important to consider whether the
216

See supra Part III.
See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 614–15 (“Changes in government policy often impose gains and losses
on those who made investments prior to reform. This observation holds true regardless of whether the changes
are implemented, modified, or clarified by courts, regulatory agencies, or legislatures; it also applies to
changes in the likelihood that such actions will be taken.”); Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 19, at 155–58
(discussing the costs that can result from policy reversals by administrative agencies).
217
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disruption-based, systemic perspective that I have advocated should extend
beyond the judiciary.
Disruptive impacts can result from any change to the legal regime. The
desire to promote stability and minimize tumult accordingly might be viewed
as creating a general preference for legal continuity across all branches of
government. With respect to legislative and executive actors, however, there is
a competing interest in political responsiveness. The people enact their policy
preferences through their elected representatives, and the effectuation of the
democratic will serves as a counterweight against the pull of constancy.218
In the context of judicial decision making, the value of political
responsiveness dissolves. The role of the judge is in large part defined by the
need to resist shifting political tides. Though the federal process of judicial
appointment and confirmation is steeped in political considerations,219 the
Constitution provides the Justices with substantial insulation from popular
accountability for their decisions.220 That structural arrangement reflects a
vision of judging as separate from politically responsive lawmaking.221 It
justifies the maintenance of a special inclination in favor of continuity within
the judiciary notwithstanding the ebb and flow of politics.222
Even so, respect for precedent and a general preference for stability
continue to possess some value within the political branches.223 While the role
of democratic responsiveness will affect the degree to which change is deemed

218 Cf. Graetz, supra note 80, at 78–79 (“[A] requirement that once a law is enacted it must remain
unchanged raises fairness problems itself, particularly in a system of laws produced by representative
democratic political institutions, subject to periodic changes in representation and political leadership.”).
219 I suspect the same principles would apply even to elected judges on state courts, on the rationale that
their decisions should not be affected by considerations of political accountability.
220 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour.”); Dorf, supra note 2, at 2029 (“By the deliberate design of Article III,
federal judges cannot be held accountable to political pressures.”).
221 See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 19, at 148 (“One pillar of the rule of law is the ideal that
governmental pronouncements about the intrinsic meaning of legal texts should aspire to be impersonal and
principled rather than results-oriented and political.”).
222 Along similar lines, Jeremy Waldron has suggested that the potential rapidity of adjudicative change
creates a greater need for constancy within the judiciary. See Waldron, supra note 29, at 28 (“So far as
legislation is concerned, the processes are cumbersome and hard to mobilize . . . . But judicial decisions are
made every day, each one with the potential to change the law.”).
223 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 48 (2010) (“[W]hen Congress or the
executive branch has the last word on constitutional issues in the United States . . . they often use a precedentbased, common law approach.”).
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desirable, this Article’s urging of an analytical focus on disruption and
systemic effects is equally applicable to any department of government.224
D. Contextualizing Disruption
The disruptive consequences of adjudicative change are only one element
of the stare decisis enterprise. As Justice Brandeis’s aphorism about the
distinction between “settled” and “settled right” reminds us, there are other
aspects to consider.225 Under the Supreme Court’s doctrine of stare decisis, the
choice to retain a dubious precedent depends on evaluating both the interest in
preserving what was previously decided and the interest in implementing a
sound interpretation of the law.226 Once the Court has assessed the disruptive
effects likely to accompany a deviation from precedent, it must decide whether
those effects are outweighed by the harms associated with keeping the
offending precedent on the books.227 Though this Article has dealt with matters
of reliance and disruption, it is worth spending a moment to bring the
competing considerations into view.
Repudiating a dubious precedent can yield benefits as well as costs.228 The
most obvious gain is the replacement of the flawed legal rule with a superior
one. Perpetuation of the flawed rule may create actual costs that could be
avoided by its repudiation. The continued failure to implement the correct rule
may also create opportunity costs by denying society the advantages that
would accrue if the law were interpreted correctly. These points are predicated
on the assumption that the subsequent court is accurate in its conclusion
regarding which legal rule is substantively correct, as well as the assumption

224 The Legislative and Executive Branches also have greater powers than the courts to strike
compromises that may result in more equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of legal change. Those
powers could affect the calculus of whether a given change reflects desirable policy, though they do not dilute
the importance of adopting a systemic perspective toward the disruptive impact of overrulings.
225 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
226 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“When
considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having
constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right.”).
227 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (“To be sure,
reliance on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it . . . . The reliance interests here,
however, . . . cannot justify an inefficient rule . . . .” (citations omitted)).
228 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 199 (2006) (“Let’s assume that
the rule of law provides very great benefits. We can nonetheless imagine that the benefits of the rule of law can
be outweighed if the substance of the legal status quo is sufficiently bad.”).
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that implementing the correct rule really is a good thing for society.229 Both
assumptions may be questioned,230 but if one believes that correct
interpretations of the law are presumptively beneficial and that subsequent
courts possess the ability to identify where their predecessors went astray,
permitting breaks from settled precedent can be desirable—at least when the
disruptive impacts of change are not overwhelming.
Discarding a cumbersome precedent may also yield benefits in terms of
decisional efficiency and predictability by supplanting a rule that has proved
unworkable in application.231 In addition, when two discrete lines of precedent
come into apparent conflict, discarding one of the lines can enhance the
coherence and rationality of the legal backdrop by eliminating a glaring
incompatibility.232 There are also potential rule-of-law benefits to maintaining
the legal system’s ability to adapt, self-correct, and respond to reasoned
argument.233 The judiciary’s resolute retention of a flawed precedent might
occasionally do more to hamper the rule of law than to promote it.234 In those
cases the courts can provide “greater reassurance of the rule of law by
eliminating [rather] than by retaining” a problematic decision.235 Finally,

229 Cf. Fisch, supra note 59, at 103 (“Modern transition analysis is premised on the assumption that legal
change generally improves the law . . . .”); Kaplow, supra note 43, at 521 (noting that if the relevant legal
changes “were undesirable, transition policies that inhibited reforms to the greatest extent possible would be
beneficial”).
230 See Logue, supra note 84, at 236 (noting the importance of distinguishing situations where “we can
expect law to make distinct, identifiable, long-term progress over time” from situations “where the law is
expected instead to cycle back and forth between various policies either based on alternative and mutually
exclusive visions of the good or, less optimistically, based on shifting coalitions among interest groups”).
231 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009) (“[T]he fact that a decision has proved
‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991))).
232 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 232 (1995) (O’Connor, J.) (“We cannot
adhere to our most recent decision without colliding with an accepted and established doctrine.”).
233 See Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2008) (“Instead
of the certainty that makes private freedom possible, the procedural aspects of the Rule of Law seem to value
opportunities for active engagement in the administration of public affairs.”).
234 See Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 37, 40–41 (2013).
235 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 144
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn precedent at
odds with later, more enlightened decisions.”); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970)
(“[A] judicious reconsideration of precedent cannot be as threatening to public faith in the judiciary as
continued adherence to a rule unjustified in reason, which produces different results for breaches of duty in
situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.”); Waldron, supra note 29, at 7 (noting that adherence to
precedent might create rule-of-law costs by forcing a judge to “submit to the continuing effect of the decisions
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correcting an erroneous interpretation can “promote[] ‘democratic values’ by
bringing the law enforced in court closer to the collective judgments that our
representatives have authoritatively expressed.”236
The objective of this superficial overview is simply to underscore the
breadth of factors that may inform the stare decisis enterprise. Depending on
their theories of interpretation and adjudication, different judges and
commentators will give varying import to these factors.237 Different judges and
commentators will also adopt different views of the comparative significance
of minimizing societal disruption. This Article does not presuppose or
advocate any particular view of the relative weight to which considerations of
disruption should be entitled in the doctrinal calculus. My point is simply this:
any judge or commentator who is inclined to give some regard to settled
expectations needs a theoretical justification for paying attention to such
expectations and an analytical framework for assessing them.
CONCLUSION
In a previous article, I argued that reliance considerations are even more
important to the Supreme Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence than is commonly
noted, but that the inquiry into reliance is often conducted indirectly and
superficially.238 The conception of reliance I offered was broad, encompassing
past behaviors as well as forward-looking effects.239
This Article has added two dimensions to that argument. The first entails
grappling with the threshold question of why reliance on precedent warrants
judicial attention in the first place. I have contended that there are several
potential answers, but that all of them face serious challenges. The Article’s
second undertaking has been to urge an analytical shift from backward-looking
reliance to the forward-looking transition costs of adjudicative change.
Defining the problem in terms of disruption emphasizes the focus of stare
decisis on managing social costs rather than protecting individual rights and

of people in the past even though (as he sees it) their decisions are taking us in a direction contrary to that
required by the independent source of law”).
236 Nelson, supra note 118, at 61–62 (also arguing that “the primary reason we want courts to avoid
erroneous interpretations of the written law is that we value democracy”).
237 See generally Kozel, supra note 50 (analyzing the ways in which theories of precedent are derivative
of methods of legal interpretation).
238 See Kozel, supra note 136, at 414 (arguing that many of the factors that are relevant to the Supreme
Court’s application of stare decisis are better viewed as proxies for the implicated reliance interests).
239 See id. at 453–64.
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investment-backed expectations. It accordingly provides a means of indirectly
validating the doctrinal focus on stakeholder expectations without needing to
answer the thorny question of whether stakeholder reliance warrants protection
on moral, pragmatic, economic, or other grounds.

